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IDENTIFYING SECTION 306 STOCK: THE SLEEPING
BEAUTY OF REVENUE RULING 66-332
Saul Levmore*
N 1920 in Eisner v. Macomber,' the Supreme Court held that a
pro rata common stock dividend was not income within the
meaning of the sixteenth amendment because it did not represent
a shift of value from the corporation to its shareholders.2 In subsequent cases, the Court changed the focus of its analysis and held
that Eisner applied only to stock dividends which did not affect
the proportionate rights and interests of the shareholders.8 This
proportionate interest test was interpreted by the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Chamberlin v. Commissioner to allow a
"preferred stock bail-out."
In a typical preferred stock bailout, the shareholders in a profitable corporation arrange a dividend of preferred stock on common
with the intent of selling the preferred to outsiders followed, perhaps, by a redemption of the preferred. The shareholders' goal is
to receive cash taxable at capital gain rather than ordinary rates
while maintaining their equity interest in the corporation." In
Chamberlin, the shareholders arranged a pro rata preferred dividend on common and immediately sold the preferred to insurance
companies. The corporation agreed to redeem the preferred over a
seven year period. 6 The Sixth Circuit held that a bona fide stock
dividend that did not alter the shareholders' preexisting proportionate interests or increase the intrinsic values of those interests
was not taxable under Eisner and that the timing of subsequent
dispositions of the stock was immaterial.7 In response to Chamber* Mr. Levmore is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of
Law.
252 U.S. 189 (1920).
Id. at 211, 219.
o See Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604, 607 (1943); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371,
375 (1942); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1935).
- 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954).
5 See generally B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders 1 10.01 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Bittker & Eustice].
* See 207 F.2d at 464-65.
Id. at 469-70.
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lin, Congress enacted section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code.'
This article focuses on the features of section 306 stock that distinguish it from common stock, and not on the complicated details
of section 3069 or on the many policy and planning issues it stimulates. 10 The article first considers the purpose and mechanics of
section 306 in a general manner. It then discusses several revenue
rulings that have attempted to identify the distinguishing features
of section 306 stock and suggests alternative approaches that are
more effective in preventing bailouts of earnings and profits. Finally, the article examines a recently modified and disfavored revenue ruling in detail and considers its possible effect as a deterrent
to self-dealing corporate fiduciaries. It concludes that the Internal
Revenue Service's original treatment of the recapitalization at issue was superior to its modification, both from a tax and corporate
law perspective.
I.

THE DISTINCTIVE EFFECT OF SECTION

306

Section 306 is a distinctive landmark in the corporate tax landscape." It is a wait-and-see remedy for the preferred stock bailout
in that, while the stock is tainted at issue, 2 dividend taxation is

imposed only upon disposition of the preferred stock. I Alterna- I.R.C. § 306.
9 For an exhaustive review of the mechanics of § 306, see Alexander & Louis, Bail-Outs
and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 65 Yale L.J. 909 (1956).
10 See generally Lowe, Bailouts: Their Role in CorporatePlanning, 30 Tax L. Rev. 357
(1975).
See generally Bittker & Eustice, supra note 5, ch. 10.
"
See I.R.C. § 306(c). Section 306(c) provides, in relevant part:
(c)Section 306 stock defined.(1) In general.-For purposes of this subchapter, the term "section 306 stock"
means ....
(A) Distributed to seller.-Stock (other than common stock issued with respect to common stock) which was distributed to the shareholder selling or otherwise disposing of such stock if, by reason of section 305(a), any part of such
distribution was not includible in the gross income of the shareholder.

Id.
13 See id. § 306(a). Section 306(a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) General Rule.-If a shareholder sells or otherwise disposes of section 306 stock
(1) Dispositions other than redemptions.-If such disposition is not a redemption .... (A) The amount realized shall be treated as ordinary income.
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tively, the bailout potential could have been stifled by imposing

1
dividend treatment at the time of the preferred stock dividend. 4
Congress, however, appears to have been sensitive to the utility of

preferred stock in intergenerational transfers of corporate ownership. 15 In this familiar context, an older generation uses a recapitalization to secure for itself a source of retirement income in the
form of preferred dividends and liquidation rights. Younger newcomers, meanwhile, reduce their initial capital needs, but are able

to obtain voting control and bear the long term economic risks
presented by the firm because they own all the common stock. If
Congress had decided to tax preferred stock dividends upon distribution, the intergenerational transfer of some businesses might
have been impeded. For the most part, attempts to exploit this
congressional sensitivity, by selling previously distributed preferred stock and claiming capital gains treatment, are stymied by

the wait-and-see strategy of section 306 which reasserts the ordinary income tax at the time of disposition.1

The distinctive treatment of section 306 stock lies in contrast to,
and in compromise of, the alternative treatments of common stock
and debt. A common stock dividend also could be used to bail out
earnings and profits at capital gain rates if a willing investor could

be found to purchase an equity interest in the enterprise. 7 In fact,
a stock dividend is hardly necessary; earnings and profits are
bailed out daily by sales of stock of corporations that have retained
(2) Redemption.-If the disposition is a redemption, the amount realized shall
be treated as a distribution of property to which section 301 applies.
Id.
" Prior to Chamberlin, the Service had some success discouraging bailout devices by refusing to rule that a dividend of preferred stock was nontaxable if a sale of the dividend
shares was contemplated. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 5, at 10.01.
" See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4621, 4673. The Senate Finance Committee expressed an intent to "liberalize" the law
with respect to "cases which involve mere rearrangements of corporate structure" while at
the same time taxing distributions which are in substance (if not in form) dividends at
ordinary rather than capital rates. See id.
" The wait-and-see strategy of § 306 is repeated in the Code's treatment of distributions
that are coincidental with reorganizations. Bonds and common stock are treated as they are
when directly distributed (with important modifications not relevant here, see I.R.C. §§ 354356), while § 306(c)(1)(B) defines section 306 stock to include such stock received in a corporate reorganization, see id. § 306(c)(1)(B).
1" See id. § 305(a). Section 305(a) provides that stock distributed with respect to the
issuer's stock generally is not included in gross income. See id.
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their earnings rather than distributed taxable dividends. Presumably, preferred stock dividends are treated more harshly because investors are more willing to buy promises of a certain and preferential nature and because owners are less eager to sell stock when
they must part with voting rights. 18
On the other "side" of preferred stock, bonds also are denied the
wait-and-see approach. Certainly bonds can be useful as aids in the
intergenerational transfer of ownership. Retireees could enjoy relatively assured, periodic payments, and newcomers might well be
willing to bear the burden of senior securities in exchange for total
control of the firm. Here the Code is not as generous with deferral
and forgiveness as it is in the case of common stock; nor does it
adopt the wait-and-see approach of preferred stock. Instead, bonds
that are distributed are taxed to the recipients as if they were
cash. 19 Presumably, bonds are so much more attractive than common stock that they clearly fail to fit the Eisner v. Macomber
model, codified in section 305, in which mere changes in paper representations of wealth are deemed insufficient to trigger a taxable
event.2 0
II.

DEFINING SECTION

A.

306

STOCK

DistinguishingFeatures

Section 306(c) parenthetically excludes from the definition of
section 306 stock "common stock issued with respect to common
stock.

12

1

A statutory definition of common stock, however, is not

provided. Generally, this refusal of the Code to distinguish between common and section 306 stock is not troublesome, because
the nature of the bailout abuse that Congress sought to prevent by
enacting section 306 provides the needed guidance. Thus, in Revenue Ruling 75-236, ss class A stock, received pro rata by common
shareholders in a recapitalization, was tainted as section 306 stock
because it was preferred over the class B stock in the receipt of
See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 5, at 1 10.03(1).
Corporate obligations and securities are "property" eligible for dividend treatment. See
I.R.C. §§ 317(a), 301(a); see also id. § 312(a)(2).
'o See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
"
I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(A). Section 306(c)(1)(B) excludes common stock from the definition
of section 306 stock when such stock is received in a reorganization. See id. § 306(c)(1)(B).
22

1975-1 C.B. 106.
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dividends and limited in both the amount of dividends it could
receive and its liquidation rights. 8 This ruling is straightforward
because the characteristics of the class A stock that distinguished
it from the class B stock are precisely those that, while convenient
4
for estate planning, are also expedient for sales to outsiders'
There are other cases, however, in which the ambiguity of the distinction between common and section 306 stock is disturbingly obvious. These more difficult cases often arise in the context of an
"E" reorganization in which the old common stock is retired in
favor of new, multiple classes, or shareholders are offered a choice
among various packages of new and old shares.
In Revenue Ruling 81-91,25 for example, the shareholders exchanged each share of common stock for one share of new class A
stock and one share of new class B stock in a recapitalization. The
A stock and B stock had identical par values. The class B shares
were preferred to A shares because they were entitled to an annual
cumulative dividend of six percent of par value before any dividend could be paid on A shares. Similarly, class B shares had a
prior right to repayment up to par value in the event of liquidation. After these preferences were satisfied, each share of A and B
was to share equally in dividends and liquidating distributions.
Each class of shares carried equal voting rights, and neither class'
was redeemable.' 6
The Service held that the class B stock, despite its preferences,
was common stock and therefore excepted from the taint of section
" See id. at 106.
" The estate planning function of the class A stock was explained in the ruling as follows:
By restricting the growth of the class A stock, upon the death or retirement of any
of the present shareholders, the remaining shareholders will be able to purchase the
class A stock for a sum within their means and control of the company will, therefore,
not fall into the hands of inexperienced persons. At the same time the heirs of the
deceased shareholders will share in the growth of the company through their ownership of the B stock.
Id.
Of course, the dividend preference also makes the transaction attractive to the retiring
sellers, who will enjoy a cushion beneath their claims. They may wish to stipulate that corporate salaries may not be increased without the approval of the preferred shareholders as a
class in order to preserve this cushion and minimize the need for policing by the preferred
shareholders.
1981-1 C.B. 123.
e See id. at 123.
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306. 27 This ruling came as no great surprise, because the Service

previously had highlighted the importance it attaches to common
stock's ability to participate in corporate growth and the B stock in
Revenue Ruling 81-91 did enjoy a share in distributions-and
therefore growth-in addition to its preferences. Although the regulations pertaining to section 306 offer no guidance on this matter,
the Service may have been influenced by Regulation section 1.3055(a), 8 which states: "The distinguishing feature of 'preferred
stock' for the purposes of section 305(b)(4) is not its privileged position as such, but that such privileged position is limited and that
such stock does
not participate in corporate growth to any signifi29
extent.
cant
Earlier rulings had declined to resolve section 306 questions with
this single tool offered in the section 305 regulations. Instead, a
variety of stock characteristics were relied upon, including
redeemability, s0 existence of limitations or preferences,31 bailout

potential, 2 and relative risk and return exposures.8 8 A number of
recent rulings, however, have indicated the emerging and, perhaps,
exclusive importance of "sharing in corporate growth" as the key
distinguishing trait of common stock. Revenue Rulings 75-222,"
"

Id. at 124.

Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(a).
29 Id. The regulations emphasize that the participation in corporate growth must be substantial. Thus, an example in the regulations classifies stock as preferred--although it
shares in corporate growth-because by its terms it shares only after substantial preferences
are satisfied. The earnings record, growth rate, and number of outstanding shares are such
that in the year of the distribution it would be unreasonable to consider the right to share in
corporate growth as imparting real value. See id. § 1.305-5(d), Ex. 8.
10 See Rev. Rul. 57-132, 1957-1 C.B. 115 (redeemable stock not considered common stock
under § 306(c)(1)(B)).Redeemability retains its vitality as a tainting feature if the redemption can be compelled by the corporate issuer. See Walter, "PreferredStock" and "Common
Stock": The Meaning of the Terms and the Importance of the Distinction for Tax Purposes, 5 J. Corp. Tax'n 211, 217 (1978).
"I See Rev. Rul. 75-236, 1975-1 C.B. 106 (class of nonredeemable stock with five percent
dividend preference, share in liquidation up to par value, and exclusive voting rights held
section 306 stock).
" See Rev. Rul. 76-386, 1976-2 C.B. 95; Walter, supra note 30,at 217-18; see also Rev.
Rul. 76-387, 1976-2 C.B. 96. Although the rulings do mention the potential for bailout, this
feature is the goal of the exercise and thus not a convenient tool for distinguishing between
common and section 306 stock.
" It seems that "relative risk" merely restates whether the stock in question shares in
"unrestricted corporate growth." One ruling, however, examined the two features as if they
were separable. See Rev. Rul. 75-222, 1975-1 C.B. 105, 105.
1975-1 C.B. 105, 105.
38
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76-386,35 76-387," and 79-16383 all noted that an unrestricted interest in corporate growth is a key factor in determining whether
stock is common or section 306 stock. Moreover, Revenue Ruling
75-23638 referred directly and approvingly to the section 305 regulations in distinguishing between common and section 306 stock.3
The emergence of "shared corporate growth" as the focal point of
attempts to distinguish between common and section 306 stock has
been further encouraged by one commentator who has concluded
that this principle "can, with only slight modification, explain
most, if not all, of the cases and rulings. . .. ",0
Revenue Ruling 81-91 did not test the exclusiveness of the corporate growth principle because the class B stock enjoyed equal
voting power and was not redeemable."1 Still, it is somewhat of an
exageration to conclude, as does Revenue Ruling 81-91, that "the
bailout abuse that Congress sought to prevent by the enactment of
section 306 cannot be effected through a sale of the class B
stock. '4 2 After all, this class B stock is substantially more attractive to outside investors than typical common stock or the class A
stock. The annual cumulative six percent dividend that precedes
any payout to the A shareholders provides a substantial cushion
for attracting potential investors. The B stock differs from classic
section 306 stock because it shares in any distributions that can be
managed by the corporation after the six percent obligation has
been met. The typical outside investor, however, should discount
the value of this sharing feature because the firm's managers will
have a somewhat reduced incentive to perform well because they
now share the "upside" returns with outsiders who own B stock.
Thus, the six percent preference becomes an important element of
protection and distinguishes this B stock from typical common
stock. Similarly, the preference in liquidation enhances and distinguishes the B stock.
The B stock's voting power in Revenue Ruling 81-91 is a less
- 1976-2 C.B. 95, 96.
- 1976-2 C.B. 96, 96-97.
1979-1 C.B. 131, 132.
1975-1 C.B. 106.

37

41

See id. at 106.
Walter, supra note 30, at 225.
See 1981-1 C.B. at 123.

42

Id. at 124.
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important feature for distinguishing between common and section
306 stock.43 Certain corporate decisions may require the approval
of each class of outstanding stock (voting as a class), and therefore,
the issuance of a preferred stock dividend and its subsequent sale
(even if the stock is redeemable by its terms) may entail the loss of
some voting power by the sellers. On the other hand, a corporate
charter with a simple majority voting mechanism may serve to
maintain complete control in the hands of the class A shareholders
if, when they sell B stock to an outsider, they retain sufficient B
shares to maintain a majority of all outstanding shares. The inattention paid to voting rights in identifying section 306 stock, therefore, is quite sensible. Use of voting rights as a determinative feature would require an inquiry into share ownership, voting
agreements, and state law and, thus, hardly would contribute to a
more certain atmosphere for business planning.
B. The Potentialfor Abuse
The analyses contained in Revenue Ruling 81-91 and in the recent tax literature are overly simple and should encourage tax
avoiders to effect classic preferred stock bailouts with a "safe harbor" modification derived from the focus on corporate growth.
Specifically, the convergence of attention on the corporate growth
feature of a class of stock implies that in a recapitalization, old
common stock owners can be given new common and class Z stock
which is preferred as to dividends (to the extent of a percentage of
par value) but also shares in additional dividends and any liquidation payouts. This new class Z stock may survive as common stock
and escape the taint of section 306 even if it receives as little as ten
percent of all distributions beyond its preferred amount. 44 If the
"' See Rev. Rul. 76-387, 1976-2 C.B. 96, 97. The ruling discounted the difference in voting
rights between two classes of stock while distinguishing common from section 306 stock.
Rev. RUl. 81-91 supports its reasoning by noting that the B stock cannot be sold without
loss of voting control. See 1981-1 C.B. at 124. Relative voting rights were also passed over in
Rev. RUl. 57-132, 1957-1 C.B. 115, in which one class was redeemable at 110% of book value
and nonvoting. In all other respects the two classes were identical. The ruling tainted the
class as section 306 stock because it was redeemable. See id. at 115.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d), Exs. (8) & (9). Example (8) examines the likelihood that a
preferred class of stock will participate in current and anticipated earnings and growth in
evaluating its tax treatment upon distribution. It can be read to acknowledge the presence
of "unrestricted growth" if any money beyond that committed to preferences reasonably
might be available in the future. If this interpretation is correct, class Z stock would escape
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critical requirement is an unrestricted growth feature, then class Z
can be endowed with a right to share in distributions but remain a
powerful bailout tool by virtue of its substantial preference.
This bailout potential would retain its vitality even if the Service
were to modify its position and require the unrestricted growth
feature to be accompanied by voting rights. It is relatively easy to
endow both Z and new common stock with voting rights but structure the corporate charter and volume of Z stock so that, after a
sale of the Z stock to an outsider in a bailout, the new common
stock will retain voting control.
Although the Service's reliance on the existence of an "unrestricted growth feature" as the means of distinguishing between
common and section 306 stock is thus vulnerable to abusive tax
avoidance, it does not follow that Revenue Ruling 81-91 and its
companions are decided incorrectly. As noted earlier, there is also
room for tax avoiding bailouts through the issue of a classic common stock dividend on common stock; these new shares can be
sold without the payment of an ordinary income tax by a seller
who owned the underlying common stock while earnings and profits were accumulated. 5 Quite simply, a line-drawing problem came
into existence once Congress decided to await distributions or sales
rather than to tax shareholders on their corporations' profits as
these profits accrued." Eisner v. Macomber exacerbated this linedrawing problem: some distributions, such as classic common stock
dividends, were declared exempt from the class of events that trigger the shareholder level tax. 4 Accepting these congressional and
judicial decisions as given, it is difficult to know how far to extend
their reach. The amount of room allowed abusive bailouts and the
weight afforded the various factors that contribute to the bailout

§ 306 taint if its holders can receive, or reasonably can expect to receive, any distributions
beyond the preferred amount. Ten percent, therefore, is chosen as an aggressive example
rather than a dividing line.
" See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
" Section 301 is an instance of congressional generosity because the economically "natural" time to impose a shareholder tax would be when the corporation's value increases and
not when this increased value is physically distributed. Of course, this natural timing would
require periodic appraisals of corporate assets. Instead, the Code awaits a corporate distribution (or shareholder disposition) and takes a lighter toll if the shareholder's gain reflects
asset appreciation rather than earnings and profits.
47 Section 305 codifies this principle. See I.R.C. § 305. The shareholder level tax thus is
further removed from its "natural" time.
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potential before the pall of section 306 is cast are issues that must
be resolved. Given the economically arbitrary nature of the occasions chosen for the imposition of a tax, it is difficult to extend the
few explicit instructions in the Code to cover the myriad situations
that can arise.
The interesting aspect of such an analytical and intellectual
dead end is that the cases which come before judges or the Service
are particularly open to case-by-case inspection. When the legal
standard is not "whether" but rather "to what extent" the bailout
abuse that Congress sought to prevent with section 306 is present,
it is tempting to set the world right with the tools of tax litigation.
C.

Revenue Ruling 66-332

Revenue Ruling 66-3328 provides an illustration of the case-bycase approach. A corporation with one class of common stock recapitalized so that there were three classes of stock: A, B, and Preferred. The corporation's common stock was reclassified as class A
stock, and the shareholders could retain the class A stock or exchange all or part of it for class B and Preferred stock. The exchange ratio was one share of class A stock for one share of class B
stock and one share of Preferred stock." The Preferred shareholders were entitled to a cumulative dividend of seven dollars per
share before any other dividend payout. On liquidation, they received preference, up to par value, on any distributions of assets.
The Preferred shareholders enjoyed no voting rights except in the
event of dividend arrearage.50 The class A shareholders were entitled to a cumulative dividend of seven dollars per share after payment of the Preferred dividend but before any dividend payments
to class B shareholders. Any further distribution would be paid
equally to A and B shareholders. On liquidation, the holders of the
class A stock were entitled to a distribution up to one and one-half
times the amount of its par value after the liquidation payment to
the Preferred shareholders but prior to any payments to the class
B shareholders. Holders of class A and B stock then would share
equally in any further liquidating distributions. The A sharehold-

48

1966-2 C.B. 108.

See id. at 109.
See id.
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ers enjoyed voting rights.5 1 The class B shareholders, after payment of the cumulative dividends and liquidation preferences on
Preferred and A stock, would share equally with the holders of A
distributions. The B shareholders also enjoyed
stock in all further
2
voting rights.5
In determining which classes of stock were tainted as section 306
stock, the Service reached a three part conclusion. With respect to
shareholders who exchanged all of their class A stock, the Service
held that the new B stock was common stock and the new Preferred stock was section 306 stock. 8 With regard to shareholders
who exchanged only part of their class A stock and therefore
owned A, B, and Preferred stock, the Service held that the A stock
was not common stock because it had preferences over the B stock.
Thus, both the A and the Preferred stock were classified as section
306 stock." Finally, with regard to those shareholders who retained
all of their A stock, the Service held that although the A stock was
preferred in some sense, it was not section 306 stock because the
transaction "was not substantially the same as [the A shareholders'] having received a stock dividend." '
It appears, at first, that the second part of the ruling deals
harshly with those shareholders who exchanged only a part of their
class A stock. It is true that both the A and Preferred stock were
endowed with preferences that the B stock lacked. Therefore, both
the A stock and the Preferred stock were more salable to outsiders
in a manner that bailed out earnings and profits. The A stock,
however, was really a substitute for the old common stock and, arguably, cannot be considered as having been received as a stock
dividend.
Indeed, in Revenue Ruling 81-91 the Service disapproved of and
modified this part of Revenue Ruling 66-332, albeit on somewhat
different grounds.' 6 The modification, in keeping with the arbi-

52
"

See id.
See id.
See id. at 110.
See id.

55Id.; see also I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(B)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(d); Rev. Rul. 60-1, 1960-1
C.B. 144. The Service determined that if cash had been received by this group in lieu of A
stock, it would not have been taxable as a dividend. See 1966-2 C.B. at 110.
" See 1981-1 C.B. at 124. The Service also modified the theory, but not the result, of the
third part of Rev. Rul. 66-332 on the same grounds. See id. at 124-25. One commentator has
also disapproved of Rev. Rul. 66-332, arguing that stock entitled to preferences and a share
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trary line-drawing of Revenue Rulings 79-163 and 81-91, relies on
the fact that the class A stock could not be sold "without a loss of
an interest in the unrestricted equitable growth of the corporation." As such, the Service now declares that this class A stock is
properly excepted from the definition of section 306 stock and instead is untainted common stock. Although this modification overcomes the harshness of Revenue Ruling 66-332 to those shareholders who retained some class A stock and found it tainted in passing, its reliance on the unrestricted growth feature is troubling."
As such, this article now turns to a discussion of alternative methods of distinguishing between classes of stock and then to a more
complete analysis of Revenue Ruling 66-332.
III.

ALTERNATIVES FOR DISTINGUISHING SECTION

306

STOCK

The "unrestricted growth" feature that the Service has used to
differentiate common from section 306 stock is unsatisfying. It is
too easy to design stock that contains this feature yet enjoys sufficient preferences to effect the bailouts that Congress sought to
prevent by enacting section 306. There are a number of alternative
methods of analysis that might be adopted.
The first and harshest of these alternatives adopts the contours
of section 305, in which Congress sought to preserve the Eisner v.
Macomber result while curbing abusive practices, such as offering
shareholders the choice of a cash dividend or a tax-free stock dividend. Essentially, section 305 draws a tight circle around Eisner v.
Macomber and taxes every part of a distribution that allows any
choice or is anything but a strictly pro rata distribution on common stock. Section 306 could be analogously interpreted to define
section 306 stock to include any issue that is likely to be easier to
sell to outsiders than the most junior of the corporation's securities. Under such a rule, the B stock in Revenue Ruling 81-91 and
both the Preferred and A stock in Revenue Ruling 66-332 would be
tainted as section 306 stock.5 9
A second and more objective rule would define common stock as

in corporate growth is not significantly different from a second class of common stock receiving dividends at a different rate. See Walter, supra note 30, at 223.
57 1981-1 C.B. at 124.
See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
See text accompanying note 61 infra.
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any stock which had an "unrestricted share in growth" but also
had no preference over any other class of security. Any stock not
meeting this definition would be section 306 stock. Thus, for example, if, in a reorganization, the class A stock distributed received
ten percent of all dividends and liquidating distributions and the
class B stock distributed received ninety percent, neither would be
tainted as section 306 stock under the "unrestricted share in
growth" standard and neither would be tainted under the "no
preference" rule. The first proposed rule, however, could be interpreted to classify the B stock as section 306 stock, because it might
be "easier to sell." The no preference rule would taint the B stock
in Revenue Ruling 81-91 and both the Preferred and A stock in
Revenue Ruling 66-332.60 Under either of the proposed rules, the
question remains whether, in Revenue Ruling 66-332, those shareholders whose old stock was merely converted into A stock, received the A stock in a transaction substantially equivalent to a
stock dividend.6
Although these suggested rules may seem unduly harsh, it
should be recalled that the section 306 taint was intended as a
Both proposed rules would taint the hypothetical Z stock developed earlier to abuse
the emerging standard of unrestricted growth. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
" See note 55 supra and accompanying text. Note that the "no preference" requirement
can be interpreted to refer to a comparison between the stock in question and any other
class of stock held by the same shareholder, in which case this second rule produces the
identical result as that reached in Revenue Ruling 66-332. In any event, the tainting of the
retained shares may be of no significance; on disposition of the entire holding, capital gains
treatment still may be available because the seller owns no common (B) stock and his interest, therefore, is terminated. Section 306(b)(1) provides that if the disposition terminates
the shareholder's stock interest, is not a redemption, and is not to a related shareholder,
then the ordinary income treatment normally triggered by a disposition of section 306 stock
is not required. See I.R.C. § 306(b)(1). Arguably, if the disposition of the tainted stock follows, rather than accompanies, the termination of the common stock interest, the same result is appropriate. See Treas. Reg. § 1.306-2(b)(3); Bittker & Eustice, supra note 5, at 1
10.05(1).
In view of the text's analysis of Rev. Rul. 66-332 which follows, the better approach in the
context of a recapitalization would seem to be a less literal reading of § 306(b)(1) and a
refusal to give capital gains treatment on a disposition (of the A stock) that follows the
termination of the shareholder's common stock interest. The logic of the Bittker & Eustice
approach, which implies that it is the entire common interest that must be terminated revolves around a shareholder's ability, in the typical case, to first sell his common stock and
then acquire clearly untainted preferred stock. This strategy, however, is not available in a
recapitalization, so that if the disposition of section 306 stock follows the termination of the
common stock interest, the Service might claim ordinary income treatment and find§
306(b)(1) inapplicable.
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check to insure that taxpayers do not abuse the congressional sympathy for estate planning problems. 2 It is difficult, for example, to
comprehend just how the recapitalization that is the subject of
Revenue Ruling 66-332 could be important for business reasons or
estate planning. A retiring seller is not likely to want a package of
the most preferred stock and the most junior stock, yet that is the
package offered in the exchange.63 Similarly, Revenue Ruling 81-91
simply states that there were valid business reasons for the recapitalization" but does not indicate that the B stock's six percent
preference was necessary to fulfill that business need. If the Service is to continue using its incomplete analysis to distinguish between section 306 and common stock, then, at the very least, it
should examine for and insist on valid business reasons for the
preferences attached to any stock that will go untainted. It is suggested, however, that the Service's "unrestricted growth" test be
augmented with a "no preference" requirement. Such a rule,
among other things, would provide a more certain atmosphere for
business decisions and a more administrable standard for the
Service.
IV.

ANOTHER LOOK AT REVENUE RULING

A.

66-332

The Underlying Transaction

Revenue Ruling 66-332 did incorporate the "no preference" requirement into the test for section 306 stock, and inspection of the
underlying transaction suggests that the ruling was decided correctly and in no need of modification. Recall that each shareholder
was offered the option of retaining class A stock (old common
stock) or exchanging a share of A stock for one Preferred and one
B share.5 The typical shareholder might be expected to reason as
follows: If the corporation's future earnings and financial policy are
expected to yield a dividend of less than $14 a year, then the exchange is beneficial. The first $7 will be paid to the Preferred
shareholders and the remaining amount will be paid to the A
shareholders; therefore, a package of one Preferred and one B
"

See note 15 supra and accompanying text.

" See 1966-2 C.B. at 109.
See 1981-1 C.B. at 123.
" See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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share is superior to one A share." If $14 is the expected distribution, then the exchange is an even one in terms of dividend rights.
Finally, if a dividend of more than $14 is expected, the exchange
remains even, because the Preferred and A shareholders will each
receive $7 and additional payments will be divided equally between the A and B shareholders.
From an analysis of the dividend rights available in the exchange offer, it appears that the rational shareholder will exchange
his A stock for the package of Preferred and B stock. If dividend
payments are $14 or more, he is indifferent between the two packages, but if an annual distribution is less than $14, the package of
Preferred and B stock is more valuable than the retained A stock.
The voting rights attached to the two packages, of course, are
equal.
Upon liquidation, the Preferred shareholders are entitled to distributions up to the stock's $100 par value, after which the A
shareholders receive distributions up to one and one-half times the
stock's $100 par value. Finally, the A and B shareholders share
equally in any residual.67 Therefore, if the expected liquidation
distribution is $100 per share on the Preferred and A stock outstanding, the exchange is an even one in terms of liquidation distributions. If a distribution of less than $100 per share on the A
stock is expected, then the package of Preferred and B stock is
superior to retained A stock. Finally, if a distribution of more than
$100 per share is expected, retained A stock becomes more attractive. Assuming that the typical shareholder expects the corporation
to continue as a going concern, the rational shareholder will be less
concerned with liquidation rights than with dividends. Consequently, the choice of the Preferred and B stock package over A
stock is a clear one.
Considering the preceding analysis, those shareholders who exchanged none of their A shares or only a part of their A shares
"The analysis assumes that shareholders prefer current dividend distributions to cumulating arrearages. Otherwise, the A stock and Preferred stock are equally attractive, in terms
of dividend rights, because both are entitled to cumulative dividends. The preference for
current payouts-and not cumulated ones-stems from the fact that dividends rarely, if
ever, cumulate at the going rate of interest and continue to bear the risk of nonpayment.
" See 1966-2 C.B. at 109. Although the par value of the A stock is not stated explicitly,
the common for which the A was substituted had a par of $100, the same as that of the new
preferred. See id.

HeinOnline -- 2 Va. Tax Rev. 73 1982-1983

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 2:59

appear to have acted irrationally. There may be other considerations, however, that play a role in the decision. Assume that there
exists a group of insiders that owns only a small percentage of the
outstanding shares but that would like to obtain voting control (or
at least veto power) within the firm. The exchange described in
Revenue Ruling 66-332 can be viewed as a brilliant scheme to acquire such power, as long as the corporate charter or bylaws require voting by class for important decisions or for the election of
directors." In the extreme case, all of the shareholders who are not
part of this insider group will do their arithmetic correctly and will
exchange A shares for the package of Preferred and B shares. The
insiders, of course, will refuse the exchange. In one quick maneuver, these insiders will have advanced from minority ownership to
fifty percent control.
In reality, some non-insiders will retain their A shares. The supervision and timing of the exchanges, however, favor the insiders'
scheme. As the exchange deadline nears, the insiders may be able
to monitor the responses of most of the other shareholders and estimate the number of A shares that must be retained to control the
voting of A stock. As the exchange offer is accepted, and it becomes clear that this number is smaller and smaller, the insiders
also can exchange some A shares and develop a formidable minority voting bloc in class B. Such a bloc may be important if the
charter or bylaws leave some decisions to "supermajority" (twothirds, for example) vote by class. " More importantly, if the directors of the corporation are elected by class, with an equal number
of seats reserved for each class, and cumulatively within each class,
the insiders may be able to elect a majority, not just one-half, of

" Class voting is often required to approve critical decisions, such as amendments to the
articles of incorporation. See H. Henn, Law of Corporations § 348, at 720-21 (2d ed. 1970).
Many statutes delegate the discretion for instituting and circumscribing class voting to corporate bylaws or articles of incorporation. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1974);
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 617(a) (McKinney 1963).
19 Some state corporation laws establish supermajority voting as the norm for certain actions. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 909(a) (McKinney 1963) (sale of substantially all
assets outside regular course of business requires approval of % of shares entitled to vote);
id. § 1001 (McKinney 1963) (2/3 vote required for dissolution). These laws, however, generally permit the articles of incorporation to override statutory voting percentages. See id. §§
616, 1002 (McKinney 1963). Other state corporation laws retain majority rule as the norm
but allow the articles of incorporation to establish supermajority requirements.. See, e.g.,
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 216, 271(a), 275(b) (1974).
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the board members.
The plan that is the subject of Revenue Ruling 66-332 could well
be an innocent recapitalization. Nevertheless, it also is a remarkably potent tool for turning a minority ownership into one that controls fifty percent or more of the corporation's votes. Moreover, the
common shareholders cannot be expected to exchange shares in a
manner that foils the power play. It will be expensive for them to
organize, and it is unlikely that they will agree on the proper defensive strategy and then trust one another to carry it out.70 In any

event, the insiders probably will be able to await the decisions of a
large majority of the outstanding shareholders and then react accordingly. 1 At worst, the recapitalization into classes will fail to
develop as the insiders had hoped and they will be no worse off
than when they began; they will be minority owners in two classes
of voting stock and one class of preferred, whereas previously they
had been the minority in one class of voting stock.
70 If, for example, directors are elected cumulatively and by class, it is dangerous for a
shareholder to agree not to exchange A stock because he will risk dilution of his voting
power if his cohorts all go through with the exchange. In short, the non-insiders will be
concerned with strategic behavior among themselves and therefore are unlikely to be effective in their opposition to the insiders' scheme.
"' Assume, for example, that it appeared that the great majority of non-insiders would
retain the A stock. Just before the exchange deadline, the insiders could exchange enough A
shares to control class B, but leave themselves a significant minority voting bloc in class A.
Thus, the insiders still could achieve majority control. As a bonus, they also would profit
from the dividend benefit originally intended to induce non-insiders to exchange. See note
67 supra and accompanying text. Only a highly organized and well executed plan, in which
non-insiders who own at least two-thirds of all shares split their strength to maintain control in each class, can defeat the power play. Such a development is unlikely. See note 70
supra and accompanying text.
Note the awesome power of the well-organized minority. Assume, for example, that the
earlier conjecture regarding the importance of liquidation rights is incorrect and that the
rational shareholder faced with the recapitalization plan seeks to profit from a liquidation of
considerable size. Thus, he prefers A stock because he will receive $150 per share and then a
portion of the residual. A package of Preferred and B stock would yield only $100 and then
an equal portion of the residual. If many shareholders reason this way and choose A stock,
the insiders will enjoy a majority of B and a minority of A. As B shareholders, they will
block the liquidation that benefits the A class. Again, only an extremely well organized, and
deep-pocketed, group of shareholders could thwart the insiders' plan. They would hope to
keep their own members in line and cause just the right number to choose the package so
that the insiders will fail to gain voting control in any class. It will be almost impossible to
engineer such a plan-especially given the fact that timing is on the side of the insiders-because the shareholders who choose A stock must be convinced that the corporation
never will pay less than $14 in dividends.
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The Role of the Service

In view of the potential abuse inherent in this clever scheme, the
Service thwarted the plan by properly classifying a portion of the
A stock as section 306 stock.7 2 The treatment of shareholders who
exchange all of their A stock for Preferred and B stock is preordained by section 306 and the circumstances. 73 In addition, the
disinclination to taint the A stock owned by those shareholders
who did not participate in the exchange is strong. After all, there
must have been some shareholders who were not vying for control
with the insiders and who either did their arithmetic incorrectly or
did nothing at all. For this group to lose on the exchange and to
4 Revhave its shares tainted would surely be an insensitive result.7
enue Ruling 66-332 reaches this result by noting that although the
A stock developed some preferences in the recapitalization, it was
not received in a transaction substantially equivalent to a stock
dividend. 7 Revenue Ruling 81-91 reaches this result on the
grounds that the A stock had "an interest in the unrestricted
growth of the corporation. '76 As argued earlier, not only is this reasoning susceptible to bailout abuse,7 but also it is less true to the
7
statutory language than that of Revenue Ruling 66-332. 8
The Service is left with the question of the proper treatment of
those shareholders who exchanged only a part of their A stock for
the package of Preferred and B stock. It now should be clear that
forcing a taint on the Preferred and A stock was an ingenious
stroke. Essentially, the Service discouraged what might have been
a successful self-dealing scheme by denying capital gains treatment
on future sales of A stock (the old common) by the corporation's
insiders. The drafters of the ruling may have been confident that
" Whether the Service should do anything at all about what is essentially a corporate
fiduciary duty problem is a question that admits of no simple answer, and none is attempted here.
See I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(B); Rev. Rul. 66-332, 1966-2 C.B. at 110.
' It is also possible that exchanges could occur after the Revenue Ruling appeared. In
this case, a ruling that tainted the A stock in the hands of those who exchanged none at all
only would have helped the insiders' plan; non-insiders would quickly .exchange and the
success of the insiders' scheme would be assured, albeit at the expense of ordinary income
on the disposition of the A stock.
See 1966-2 C.B. at 110.
1981-1 C.B. at 124.
" See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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while only an unconventional reading of section 306 would agree
completely with the ruling, it was unlikely that the insiders would
go into court and subject their plan to inspection and publicity. To
be sure, the Service may not have speculated along the lines suggested in this article but may have been uneasy about the peculiar
structure of the recapitalization; as such it decided to construe section 306 strictly to avoid a potential bailout. In any event, Revenue
Ruling 66-332 represents an effective application of the Service's
powers to prevent abuse of the corporate structure.
V.

CONCLUSION

The definition of section 306 stock generally has been developed
on a case-by-case basis. It appears from Revenue Ruling 81-91 that
the Service now relies primarily, if not exclusively, on the "unrestricted share of corporate growth" criterion to distinguish common from section 306 stock. The addition of a "no preference" requirement to the section 306 stock test would promote certainty,
ease Service review, and, most importantly, minimize the bailout
potential which now exists. The "no preference" criterion may also
provide the Service with a valuable means of ruling equitably in
unusual circumstances, such as Revenue Ruling 66-332.
Revenue Ruling 66-332 had never been cited in a court opinion
or other Service ruling. It is, after all, not an opinion about corporate tax so much as it is about the potential for virtually undetectable fiduciary breaches. For better or worse, Revenue Ruling 81-91
has awakened this sleeping beauty in an innocent, but perhaps myopic way, thereby motivating this article to speculate about its hidden story.
Some readers will doubt that this article has been correct in perceiving the essence of Revenue Ruling 66-332. Their instincts may
be right, in which case the anonymity of these rulings is gratifying.
Others will agree that the evidence is strong and that the exchange
offer was bizzare enough to support the interpretation offered in
this article, but will doubt that the Service had all this in mind.
They also may be correct, but then what harm can there be in
building legends around pedestrian tax rulings? Finally, a third
group of readers may accept the analysis but object to the underhanded way of serving justice that is represented in Revenue Ruling 66-332. This objection is a serious one and not far removed
from debates concerning statutory and constitutional construction.
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Perhaps sleeping beauties should be allowed their uninterrupted
rest.
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